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A Proposal for Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors in Ohio*
George Neff Stevens
FROM Talmadge v. The Zanesville and Maysville Road Company,' decided in 1842, to Maryland Casualty Company v. Gough,2 decided in 1946,
the Supreme Court of Ohio has acknowledged and affirmed the general
principle that there is no right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. It
has applied the rule to cases involving intentional torts where the parties
acted in concert,3 to cases involving concurring or concurrent negligence
and to cases involving claims for indemnification. 5 But, it has limited the
application of the rule by
holding that, in cases where
an injury is inflicted by the
THE AuTHOR (A.B., 1931, Dartmouth College; LL.B., 1935, Cornell University; M.A.,
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1941, University of Louisville; S.J.D., 1951,
University of Michigan) is Assistant Dean of
Western Reserve University School of Law and
Dean-elect of University of Buffalo School of
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two or more persons acting
separately and the liability
of the tortfeasors as among

themselves is primary and

secondary, such tortfeasors
are not "joint" tortfeasors
and cannot be joined in the
same lawsuit.6 The reason for this distinction was dearly set forth in the
court's opinion in Larson v. The Cleveland Railway Co.:
In cases where there is such primary and secondary liability for the
identical wrong, the party who is secondarily liable has a right of indemnification from the party primarily liable, in case the former is obliged to
*This proposal was prepared by the writer as chairman of a subcommittee, composed also of H. Walter Stewart of Cleveland and Paul T. Mahon of Kenton, for
the Ohio State Bar Association's Judicial Administration and Legal Reform Committee, of which Henry G. Binns of Columbus is chairman.
'11 Ohio 197 (1842).
'146 Ohio St. 305, 65 N.E.2d 858 (1946).
'Talmadge v. Zanesville & Maysville Road Co., 11 Ohio 197 (1842) (trespass to
personal property); Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 NE. 593 (1886) (conversion of public funds) and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Gough, 146 Ohio St. 305, 65
N.E.2d 858 (1946) (conversion of funds).
"Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn. Ry., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924);
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930); U.S.
Casualty Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 129 Ohio St 391,
195 N.E. 850 (1935); The Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Pa. Road
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respond in damages.

JOINT TORTFEASORS
He would lose such right if joinder is permitted

since, in the absence of statute, there is no right of indemnification or
contribution as between joint tort-feasorswho are in pari delicto. (Italics
added)

However, this is as far as the Ohio Supreme Court has gone in giving
relief to date. The suggestion that the rule of no contribution among
joint tortfeasors was not of universal application and that it applied only
to cases where the persons have wantonly and knowingly engaged in doing
a wrong, suggested in Acheson v. Miller,8 rejected as dictum in Royalty
Indemnity Company v. Becker,9 has been revived, but only to the extent
above indicated.
The unfairness of the rule of no contribution among joint tortfeasors,
at least in the negligence cases, is apparent. It is aggravated by the fact that
the injured party, as master of his lawsuit, can place all or a disproportionate
part of the loss on one or more of the tortfeasors either by pursuing one or
more alone or, after obtaining a joint judgment against all, by executing
against one or more, to the complete exoneration of the rest The Ohio
Supreme Court, as noted, has rather recently given protection to a limited
group of tortfeasors by holding that they are not "joint" tortfeasors 1 ° But
reform through the overruling of long-established precedent, through the
drawing of fine distinctions, and through limitation of joinder procedures,
is slow, costly and frequently confusing. Recognizing this, and that reform
was needed, nineteen states have attempted to meet the problem by legislation.,'
Co., 133 Ohio St. 449, 14 N.E.2d 613 (1938); and Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co. v.
Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio St. 346, 52 N.E-2d 340 (1943).
'Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930); U.S.
Casualty Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 129 Ohio St. 391, 195 N.E.
850 (1935); The Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Pa. Road Co., 133
Ohio St. 449, 14 N.E.2d 613 (1938); and Md. Casualty Co. v. Gough, 146 Ohio
St.305, 65 N.E.2d 858 (1946).
'Larson v. The Cleveland Ry., 142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E.2d 163 (1943); Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company v. The Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio St.
346, 52 N.E.2d 340 (1943); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Frederick Co., 142 Ohio

St. 605, 53 N.E.2d 795 (1944) and Albers v. The Great Central Transport Corp.,
145 Ohio St. 129, 60 N.E.2d 669 (1945).

'143 Ohio St. 20 at p. 35.
'2 Ohio St. 203 (1853).
'122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930).

. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between joint torts as a matter of
substantive law and joinder of tortfeasors as a matter of procedure, see Editorial Note
by Edward K. Halaby, Joinder,in Ohio, of Persons Primarilyand SecondarilyLiable
for Torts, 19 U. OF CiN. L Rav. 358 (1950).
"AK STAT. ANN. (1947) §§ 34-1001 through 34-1009; laws of Del. (1949)
Ch. 151 §§ 1 through 10; GA. CODE ANN. (1933) §§ 105-2011, 105-2012, and
37-303; KY. REV. STAT. (Baldwin 1943) § 412.030; LA. CVL CODE (Dart. 1945)
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In evaluating the success of a piece of legislation in bringing about reform, it is necessary to know what reform was contemplated. But, given an
end, the value of a particular statute as a means can be readily determined.
With this in mind, a look at the provisions in these nineteen states above
mentioned may be helpful.
Assume that one of the evils which should be eliminated is the power
of the injured party to cast the loss by chance, caprice or even collusion
upon one or more of several tortfeasors.22 A statute which limits the right
of contribution to cases in which a joint judgment has been obtained against
two or more persons13 gives only partial relief, for the injured person may
exercise his option to sue only one or more of several tortfeasors. It is
submitted that the statute should provide that the right of contribution is
available whether the injured person brings his action against one, or more,
or all of the alleged joint tortfeasors.3
Assume that the next problem to be decided is the extent to which relief
by way of contribution should be given. Should relief be given only to
negligent tortfeasors or should intentional tortfeasors also be granted the
right of contribution? What about those guilty of "wanton misconduct," or
of "wilful misconduct"? The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Tighe v. Dirmond,'5 distinguishes "wilful tort" from "wanton misconduct' both from
"wilful misconduct" and all three from "negligence." It is suggested that
although distinctions of this sort look good on paper, they are very difficult
to apply to the facts of a given case. There would seem to be no good
Art. 2104; ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack 1947 Cum. Supp.) Art. 50 § 21 through
30; MICH. STAT. ANN. (1938) § 27.1401, 27.1683(1), (2), (3), (4); Mo.
Rv.STAT. ANN. (1942) § 3658; N. MEx. STAT. ANN. (1941) H§ 21-118 through
21-125; N.Y.C.P.A. (Gilbert's Bliss 1941) § 211-a; GEN. STAT. OF N. GAM (1943)
§ 1-240; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) § 831; 12 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Cum
Supp. 1947) § 2081; R. I. PUB. LAWS 1940, Ch. 940 § 1 through 10; Session Laws
of S. Dak. (1945) Ch. 167 H§ 1 through 11; ANN. TEX. STAT. (Vernon 1950)
Tide 42 Art. 2212; CODE OF VA. (1950) § 8-627; W. VA. CODE of 1943 § 5482;
Wis. STAT. (1947) § 113.01 through 113.10, 272.59 and 272.61.
"See, for example, Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn. Ry., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144
N.E. 51 (1924).
'See, for example, GA. CODE ANN. (1933) § 37-303; LA. Ctvu. CODE (Dart
1945) Art. 2104; MICH. STAT. ANN. (1938) § 27.1683(1); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
(1942) § 3658; N.Y.CP.A. (Gilbert's Bliss 1941) § 211-a; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
(1936) § 831; ANN. TEX. STAT. (Vernon 1950) Tide 42 Art. 2212; W. VA. CODE
OF 1943 § 5482; WIS. STAT. (1947) §§ 272.59 and 272.61.
See, for example, ARK. STAT. ANN. (1947) § 34-1001; Laws of Del. (1949) Ch.
151 § 1; KY. Rnv. STAT. (Baldwin 1943) § 412.030; ANN. CODE OF M. (Flack
1947 Cum Supp.) Art. 50 § 21; N. MEX. STAT.ANN. (1941) § 21-118; GEN.
STAT. OF N. CAR. (1943) § 1-240; 12 PA. STAT. ANN. (Pardon Cum. Supp. 1947)
§ 2081; R. L PUB. LAwS 1940, Ch. 940 § 1; Session Laws of S. Dak. (1945) Gb.
167 § 1; CODE OF VA. (1950) § 8-627.
'r149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948).
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reason to deny the right of contribution to the parties who have committed
an intentional tort and in the same jurisdiction permit contribution among
joint obligors who have deliberately breached a contractual obligation, or
among joint tortfeasors who have been guilty of "wanton" or "wilful" misconduct. On the other extreme, if contribution among joint tortfeasors is
to be limited to "negligence" cases, as defined in the Tighe case, the value
of the reform as a public measure is certainly limited. Of the nineteen states
which have dealt with the problem, only two limit contribution among tortfeasors to mere acts of negligence involving no moral turpitude. 6 The
other seventeen states allow contribution among joint tortfeasors regardless
of the nature of the tort involved.17 It is submitted that this is the proper
solution of the problem. No one is hurt by the broader inclusion and
it might even be argued that the possibility of contribution might act as
a deterrent to those who might otherwise connive to commit a wilful tort.
Assuming that the people of Ohio are in accord with the assumptions
above made, it is recommended that the Uniform Contribution Among
Torfeasors Act, with certain modifications, additions and deletions as hereinbelow set forth, be recommended to the legislature for adoption as the
means of accomplishing the ends desired.
AN ACT
To Provide For Contribution Among Tortfeasors, Release of Tortfeasors, and to Make Uniform the Laws with Reference Thereto.
Section 1. Joint Tortfeasors and Injured Person Defined. - For the
purposes of this Act the term:
a. "Joint tortfeasors" means two or more persons jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not
judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.
b. "Injured Person" means any person having a claim in tort for injury
to person or property.
Comment: Subsection a is from the Uniform Act; subsection b is a
clarification added by Maryland to the Uniform Act when
adopted by that state18
Section 2. Right of Contribution; Accrual, Limitations and Joinder;
Pro Rata Share; Indemnity. (1) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors.
"SKY.REV.

STAT. (Baldwin 1943) § 412.030 and CODE OF VA. (1950) § 8-627.
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. For statutory citation, see foomote 10
1t

supra.
"'ANN.

CODE OF M.

(Flack 1947 Cure. Supp.) Art. 50 § 21.
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(2) A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the common liability, or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof. A right of action for contribution shall accrue to such joint tortfeasor against any one or more joint tortfeasors by payment discharging the common liability, or by each payment
of more than his pro rata share thereof; provided, however, that no tortfeasor so sued shall be compelled to pay an amount greater than his pro
rata share of the entire judgment In determining the pro rata share of
each joint tortfeasor, only solvent tortfeasors shall be considered.
Comment: The first sentence of subsection 2 comes from the Uniform
Act. The first part of the second sentence should make
quite clear the legislative intent that more than one cause of
action for contribution may arise where a joint tortfeasor
is called upon to pay more than his share as a result of
several separate executions or garnishment procedures
against him. The proviso of the second sentence limits the
right of contribution against any joint tortfeasor to his pro
rata share. 19 This provision, therefore, places the burden
of collecting contribution from joint tortfeasors solely on
those who have paid more than their pro raa shares to the
judgment creditor. The third sentence establishes a rule of
procedure for the guidance of the court
in determining the
20
pro rata share of each joint tortfeasor.
(3)
This Act and specifically the provisions of subsection 2 of Section 2 shall not impair or limit any right of indemnity among tortfeasors
under existing law.
Comment: This provision is an amplified version of Section 6 of the
Uniform Act. It should make clear the legislative intent
that the enactment of a pro rata contribution statute does
not and is not intended to destroy the right to indemnity
existing under present Ohio law in cases where, as among
the tortfeasors, liability is primary or secondary,
as for
2
example in the Larson case above mentioned. '
Subsection 4 of Section 2 of the Uniform Act provides that
the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be
considered in determining their pro rata shares. This provision has been adopted by three states. 22 The fairness of
"Such a provision is found in the following states: LA. CiVmL CODE (Dart 1945)
Art. 2104; MIcH. STAT. ANN. (1938) § 27.1683(1); N.Y.C.P.A. (Gilbert's Bliss

1941) § 2 11-a; and ANN. TEX. STAT. (Vernon 1950) Title 42 Art. 2212.
' Such a provision is found in LA. CVM CODE (Dart 1945) Art. 2104; GEN. STAT.
OF N. CAR. (1943) § 1-240 (which also excludes nonresidents who cannot be
forced under execution of the court to contribute); and ANN. TaX. STAT. (Vernon
1950) Title 42 Art. 2212.

"142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E.2d 163 (1943).
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such a provision is patent. Although omitted from the
proposed act, it is hoped that this idea will be incorporated
into the Ohio law in the not too distant future.
(4) An action for contribution shall be commenced within two years
after the cause of action sued upon accrues under subsection 2 hereof.
Comment: The obvious purpose of this subsection is to establish a
statute
of limitations for each separate claim for contribu23
tion.
(5) Where two or more causes of action for contribution have accrued
prior to the commencement of an action on one of them, all of such actions
brought against any one or more joint tortfeasor must be joined; if not so
joined, action on such additional accrued cause or causes of action against
such joint tortfeasors so sued shall be forever barred.
Comment: Compulsory joinder of accruwd claims for contribution in
an action against any one or more joint tortfeasors will
prevent unnecessary multiplicity of actions by forcing the
settlement of all outstanding claims between the parties to
the action in a single suit.
It is suggested that no provision be made requiring compulsory joinder of joint tortfeasors. Such a requirement
might work considerable hardship on the tortfeasor who has
been forced to pay more than his pro rata share where one
or more of the joint tortfeasors were not available for or
subject to suit for any of many reasons.
(6) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured
person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
Section 3. Judgment Against One Tortfeasor.-The recovery of a
judgment by the injured person against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors.
Section 4. Release; Effect on Injured Person's Claim. -A release by
the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment,
does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but
reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which
the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the
consideration paid.
3 AmK. STAT. ANN. (1949) § 34-1002(4) (which adds "solely for the purpose
of determining their rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining
severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law."); Laws
of Delaware (1949) Ch. 151 Sec. 2(4); Session Laws of S. Dak. (1945) Ch. 167
§ 2(4).
"Michigan has established a six month period for such claims, while Rhode Island
ives two years. MICH. STAT. ANN. (1938) § 27.1683 (4); and R. I. PuB. LAws
1945 Ch. 1635(2).
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Comment: The Commissioner's Note to this provision in the Uniform
Act reads:
"This Section is intended to change the common-law
view under which a release given by an injured person to
one of two or more tortfeasors automatically releases the
others. Since this result may be avoided anyhow by giving
a covenant not to sue instead of a release, it was thought
wise to obviate what must frequently be considered a
technical pitfall by an injured person who releases one or
two or more joint tortfeasors for a certain sum, presumably
approximately the released person's share of the damage,
intending to pursue his claim against the others. The direct
bearing which this change has on contribution among tortfeasors, in view of such releases and partial settlements, is
apparent.
"The second clause of this Section is included simply
to emphasize the fact that a release of one tortfeasor will
benefit the others by reducing the claim against them in
the amount of the consideration paid therefor, or in the
amount or proportion by which the release provides that
the total claim shall be reduced, whichever is larger."
Since the Ohio cases have shown a tendency to retreat from
the common law rule, this provision merely speeds24 up a
reform that has been in the making for some time.
Section 5. Release; Effect on Right of Contribution.- A release by the
injured person of one joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from liabilitv
to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release is given
before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for
contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the
pro rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages
recoverable against all the other tortfeasors.
Section 6. When Defendant May Bring in Third Party; Third Party
Practice; and Motion Practice. (1) A defendant in a tort action who seeks indemnity or contribution
from a person, not a party, who is, or may be, liable as a joint tortfeasor to
him, for all or part of the plaintiff's claim, may, without notice to the plaintiff, before filing his answer, and with notice after filing his answer,
move the court for leave, as a third-party plaintiff, to file a third party petition and cause summons to be served upon such person, and if the motion
is granted and the summons and the third-party petition are served, such
person, called the third-party defendant, shall make his defense thereto in
the same manner as defenses are made to the original petition.
' See, for example, Adams Express Co. v. Bekwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300
(1919).
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The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses
which the defendant has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant
may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the
defendant
The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant; and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defense thereto in the same manner as defenses are
made by an original defendant to the original petition, and, in addition, such
third-party defendant so proceeded against by the plaintiff, may proceed
under this rule against any person, not a party to the action, who is, or may
be, liable as a joint torifeasor to him for all or part of the claim asserted in
the action against him.
(2) When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff he may
cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this
Section would entide a defendant to do so.
(3) A pleader may either (a) state as a cross-claim against a coparty any claim that the co-party is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for
all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-daimant; or
(b) move for judgment for contribution against any other joint judgment
debtor, where in a single action a judgment has been entered against joint
tortfeasors one of whom has discharged the judgment by payment or has
paid more than his pro rata share thereof. If relief can be obtained as
provided in this Subsection no independent action shall be maintained to
enforce the claim for contribution.
(4) The court may render such judgments, one or more in number, as
may be suitable under the provisions of this Act.
Comment: The basis of subsection 1 of Section 6 is Federal Rule 14
as amended by the Supreme Court of the United States on
December 27, 1946. The modifications and additions limit
its users to contribution and indemnity in tort actions. Subsection 1 of Section 7 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, which provided for third-party practice was
based upon the original version of Federal Rule 14. Experience with the original form of Rule 14 proved it to be
too broad. Courts held that the plaintiff need not amend his
complaint to state a claim against a third-party defendant if
he did not wish to do so. Under the amended version,
plaintiff may, but is not required to, join third-party defendants. If the plaintiff does assert a claim against the
third-party defendant, such third-party defendant should
have the right to bring in other joint tortfeasors. Provision
for this possibility is made in subsection (1) of Section 6.
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Third-party defendants against whom the plaintiff asserts
no claim do not require this protection because of the
Proviso in Section 2 (2) of the proposed Act.
The advantages of impleader, or third-party, practice are
obvious. As stated in the Commissioners' Note to Section
7 of the Uniform Act,- "In this way, the interests of
justice may be promoted by obviating the necessity of a
separate action for contribution [or indemnity]. It should
be noted that this Section does not affect in any way the
substantive law of contribution [or indemnity] concerning
the accrual of a cause of action for contribution [or indemnity] as set forth in Subsection 2 of Section 2, above.
It merely provides for a litigation, in advance, of those
issues upon which the claim for a money judgment for
contribution [or indemnity] will ultimately depend."
The biggest objection to impleader- that the defendant
can force a plaintiff to join additional defendants- has
been eliminated. The plaintiff may do so, but he is not
required to do so under this proposal.
There is another very important reason why an impleader,
or third-party, practice as hereinabove suggested should
be adopted in Ohio. Your attention is directed to Maryland Casualty Co. v. FrederickCo. 25 The facts show a single
injury resulting from the concurrent negligence of two
parties acting separately. The injured person elected to
sue only one, got a judgment and collected. This action
was by the judgment debtor for indemnity on the theory that
where judgment in a tort action is had against a person
secondarily or vicariously liable, and such person has paid
the judgment, he has a right of indemnity against the
person primarily liable for the tort. The court opened with
the statement that "This court is committed to the legal
principle that there can be no contribution among joint
tortfeasors," proceeded to recognize the validity of plaintiff's theory of recovery, drew a distinction between joint
and concurrent torts, and supported the plaintiff's right to
indemnity on such facts, provided that the party secondarily
liable when sued fully and fairly informs the party
primarily liable of the claim and the pendency of the action
and gives such party full opportunity to defend or participate in the defense.
The court does not say how this is to be accomplished. Ohio
has no impleader statute, and the Larson case, above mentioned, decided at the same term of court, held that if plaintiff tried to join such parties as here found, there would be
a misjoinder!
142 Ohio St. 605, 53 N.E.2d 795 (1944).
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Of the nineteen states which have statutes dealing with
contribution among joint tortfeasors, nine permit irpleader, or third-party, practice. 26 By joining this group of
states Ohio would solve a serious procedural problem and,
in addition, would take an important step inimproving the
administration of justice.
It should be noted that the defendant does not have to mmplead joint27tortfeasors. The provision is permissive, not
mandatory.
The additional provisions of Section 6 are inserted to round
out and make effective the rights established by this Act.
Section 7 Constituonality.-If any provision of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act whicn
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this
end the provisions of this Act are declared to be severable.
Section 8. Uniformity of Interpretation.-This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states that enact it.
Section 9. Short Title. -This Act may be cited as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Section 10. RepeaL.-All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent
wtih the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 11. Time of Taking Effect -This Act shall take effect--_
-AmK. STAT.

ANN. (1947)

§ 34-1007; Laws of Del (1949) Ch. 151 § 7; ANN.

CODE OF Mn. (Flack 1947 Cum. Supp.) Art 50 § 27; Mo. Rv. STAT. ANN.
(1943) § 847.20; GEN. STAT. OF N. CAR. (1943) § 1-240; Pa. Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 2252 (a); Session Laws of S. Dak. (1945) Ch. 167 § 7; Texas (by
case law); and Wis. STAT. (1947) § 263.15.

'For a good case on what must be alleged and proved to enforce contribution, see
City of Charlotte v. Cole, 223 N. Car. 106, 25 S._.2d 407 (1943). For a recent
collection of cases on the right of defendant in an action for personal injury or
death to bring in joint tortfeasors for purpose of asserting a right of contribution, see
11 A.L.R. 2d 228 (1950).

